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I. Introduction 
In the early spring of 2009, I wrote an article on the federal 
government’s bailout of American International Group, Inc. (AIG) 
entitled The AIG Bailout.1 The bailout was necessitated by AIG’s 
disastrous multi-billion dollar bets on the United States housing 
market that brought it to the brink of bankruptcy.2 At the time, 
AIG was the largest insurance company in the United States.3 
Because of its size and interconnectedness, and the fact that 
financial markets were already under serious distress, it was 
feared that AIG’s failure would lead to the disintegration of the 
                                                                                                     
  Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of 
Law. 
 1. See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 943 (2009). 
 2. See id. at 959–62. 
 3. See id. at 944.  
796 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795 (2015) 
entire financial system.4 Hence the federal government stepped 
in with an $85 billion loan,5 with total aid ultimately reaching 
$182.5 billion.6 
Many events related to the bailout transpired after my 
article was published. Hence, this Article serves as an afterword 
to The AIG Bailout, detailing some of these post-article events. In 
that regard, the Article proceeds as follows: Part II picks up 
where Part IV of The AIG Bailout left off.7 It describes the further 
restructuring of government assistance through the 
recapitalization of AIG, details the government’s exit as AIG’s 
controlling shareholder, and considers the U.S. Department of 
Treasury’s claim of a $22.7 billion “overall positive return” on the 
AIG Bailout.8 Part III delves into the Maiden Lane III 
transactions, perhaps the most controversial part of the bailout, 
pursuant to which Société Générale, Goldman Sachs, Merrill 
Lynch and other AIGFP9 counterparties were bought out at 
essentially 100 cents on the dollar.10 Part IV examines the 
                                                                                                     
 4. See id. at 979; see also Actions Related to AIG, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK 
OF NEW YORK, http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/aig/ (last visited Apr. 2, 
2015) (describing a litany of consequences that could have been triggered by 
AIG’s failure) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 352 (2011), http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf  
AIG was so interconnected with many large commercial banks, 
investment banks, and other financial institutions through 
counterparty credit relationships on credit default swaps and other 
activities such as securities lending that its potential failure created 
systemic risk. The government concluded AIG was too big to fail and 
committed more than $180 billion to its rescue. Without the bailout, 
AIG’s default and collapse could have brought down its 
counterparties, causing cascading losses and collapses throughout the 
financial system. 
 5. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 964 (clarifying the terms of the bailout). 
 6. See id. at 975. 
 7. See infra Part II (chronicling the government’s involvement with AIG 
following the initial bailout). 
 8. See id. 
9. See infra note 66 (listing the entities that make up AIGFP). 
 10. See infra Part III; Rick Newman, 3 Lessons from the AIG Bailout, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:23 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/ 
blogs/rick-newman/2012/12/11/3-lessons-from-the-aig-bailout (last visited Apr. 2, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd–Frank),11 the principal federal regulatory 
response to the financial crisis, most relevant to what happened 
at AIG.12 Specifically, it considers how these regulations would 
have applied to AIG had they been in place prior to its collapse.13 
Part V concludes the Article.14 
II. Recapitalization and Government Exit 
This Part picks up where Part IV of The AIG Bailout left off 
regarding the details of the bailout and subsequent 
restructurings. As noted in that article, after the second 
restructuring, which was announced on March 2, 2009, total aid 
available to AIG under various facilities was $182.5 billion as 
specified in the following table15: 




Fed Credit Facility $60.0 $42.0 
TARP Investment $40.0 $40.0 







Total $182.5 $126.1 
The government’s ownership stake in AIG at that point in time 
was represented by various AIG securities as follows:16 
  
                                                                                                     
 11. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd–Frank), Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (modifying the United 
States’ financial regulatory system). 
 12. See infra Part IV (describing the closure of the CDS regulatory gap). 
 13. See infra Part IV (analyzing specifically Titles I and VII of the Dodd–
Frank Act). 
 14. See Part V (proposing that one of the most important legacies of the 
AIG bailout is the expansion of the financial regulatory system). 
 15. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 971 (providing information on the bailout 
restructuring). 
 16. See Am. Int’l Grp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 12, 2010) [hereinafter AIG 
’10 Proxy Statement] (detailing the government’s ownership interests in AIG). 
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Securities Owner Amount Notes 





100,000 shares Issued as 
compensation for 
Fed Credit Facility 
Series E Preferred 
Stock 
Treasury 400,000 shares Issued in exchange 
for Series D 
Preferred Stock 
which Treasury 
purchased as part 
of its TARP 
investment in AIG 
Series F Preferred 
Stock 




Warrants Treasury Exercisable for 
2,690,088 shares of 
Common Stock 




The Series C Preferred Stock entitled the Trust to 
approximately 532 million votes on any matters put to a 
stockholders’ vote, which translated into approximately 77.8% of 
AIG’s outstanding voting power.18 In other words, following the 
second restructuring, the Trust was AIG’s controlling 
shareholder. 
On December 1, 2009, as contemplated by the second 
restructuring,19 AIG paid down $25 billion of the amount it owed 
the NY Fed under the Fed Credit Facility by transferring to it 
preferred equity interests in two newly formed special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs).20 One SPV held all of the outstanding common 
stock of AIG’s operating subsidiary, American International 
Assurance Company (AIA), and the other SPV held all of the 
outstanding common stock of AIG’s operating subsidiary, 
American Life Insurance Company (ALICO).21 
On September 30, 2010, AIG and the government announced 
a complex recapitalization plan to simplify AIG’s capital structure 
and put the government “in an excellent position to begin 
                                                                                                     
 17. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, note 137 and accompanying text.  
 18. See AIG ’10 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 11. 
 19. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 974 (outlining AIG’s repayment plan). 
 20. See AIG ’10 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 11 (describing the 
payment plan). 
 21. See id. at 11. 
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realizing value for taxpayers.”22 The recapitalization was 
completed on January 14, 2011.23 It included the following 
components: 
 AIG repaid the NY Fed the $21 billion it then 
owed under the Fed Credit Facility, and the 
facility was terminated. AIG funded this 
repayment with (1) a loan from AIA SPV which 
held cash from selling 67% of the ordinary shares 
of AIA in a Hong Kong initial public offering, and 
(2) a loan from ALICO SPV that held cash from 
the sale of ALICO to MetLife, Inc.24  
 AIG drew down approximately $20 billion from 
the Equity Capital Commitment Facility to buy 
back the NY Fed’s preferred equity interests in 
AIA SPV and ALICO SPV.25 
 The Trust exchanged its shares of Series C 
Preferred Stock for 562.9 million shares of AIG 
Common Stock, which the Trust then transferred 
to Treasury.26 
 Treasury exchanged its Series E Preferred Stock 
for 924.5 million shares of AIG Common Stock.27 
 Treasury exchanged its Series F Preferred Stock 
for the preferred equity interests in AIA SPV and 
ALICO SPV (the interests formally owned by the 
NY Fed), 20,000 shares of Series G Preferred 
                                                                                                     
 22. See Press Release, Am. Int’l Grp., AIG Announces Plan to Repay U.S. 
Government (2010), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=76115&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1477531 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Treasury Announces Completion of the Am. Int’l Grp. Recapitalization 
Transaction (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg1024.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (stating that the United 
States government remains hopeful to fully recover the loan for the taxpayers) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 23. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (8-K) (Jan. 14, 2011) [hereinafter AIG Current 
Report (Jan. 14, 2011)]. 
 24. See id. at 2. 
 25. See id. (describing the repurchasing of the SPV Preferred Interests). 
 26. See id. at 3 (detailing the exchange of Series G Preferred Stock to the 
U.S. Treasury for Series C, E, and F Preferred Stock). 
27. See id. 
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Stock,28 and 167.6 million shares of AIG Common 
Stock.29 
The end result of the above transactions was the consolidation of 
the government ownership of AIG with Treasury. Specifically, 
Treasury became the record holder of 1,655,037,962 shares of 
AIG Common Stock, or 92% of AIG’s outstanding voting power, 
and neither the Trust nor NY Fed any longer owned AIG 
shares.30 
Five months later (May 2011), Treasury sold 200 million of 
its 1.66 billion shares of AIG Common Stock in a public offering 
through a syndicate of underwriters.31 It followed that with five 
other public offerings in the ensuing months, and by December 
2012 it had completely liquidated its AIG Common Stock position 
as depicted in the following table: 









200,000,000 $29.00 $5.80 billion 1.46 billion 12.08% 
March 8, 
201234 
206,896,552 $29.00 $6.00 billion 1.25 billion 24.59% 
                                                                                                     
28. See AIG Current Report (Jan. 14, 2011), supra note 23, at 2. 
29. See id. at 3. 
30. See id. As mentioned in The AIG Bailout, supra note 1, at 966, it was 
reported that the government’s AIG stake was set below 80% for accounting 
reasons. Whether this was true or not at the time, staying below 80% was 
obviously no longer at issue for the recapitalization. See Steven M. Davidoff and 
David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial 
Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 489 (2009) for a more detailed look at this 80% 
issue. 
31. See Am. Int’l Grp., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus (Form 424B5) 
(May 24, 2011) [hereinafter Prospectus Supplement (May 24, 2011)]. 
 32. Compare William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Untold Story of Underwriting 
Compensation Regulation, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 628 (2010) (explaining that in 
a typical public offering the proceeds received by the seller reflect that the seller 
sells the shares to the underwriting syndicate at a discount (called the 
underwriting discount) to the price the shares are sold to the public to 
compensate the underwriters for handling the deal), with Prospectus 
Supplement (May 24, 2011), supra note 31 (noting that for these offerings AIG 
actually agreed to pay the underwriting discount on behalf of Treasury).  
 33. See Prospectus Supplement (May 24, 2011), supra note 31.  
 34. See Am. Int’l Grp., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated April 5, 
2011 (Form 424B3) (March 8, 2012). 
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May 6, 
201235 
188,524,58936 $30.50 $5.75 billion 1.06 billion 35.98% 
August 3, 
201237 
188,524,59038 $30.50 $5.75 billion 871 million 47.37% 
September 
10, 201239 
636,923,07540 $32.50 $20.70 billion 234 million 85.85% 
December 
10, 2012 
234,169,156 $32.50 $7.61 billion 0 100.00% 
Totals 1,655,037,962 $31.1841 $51,61 billion   
The May 24, 2011 offering was actually for 300,000,000 
shares with AIG selling 100,000,000 in the deal, yielding net 
proceeds to AIG of $2,856,500,000.42 As a result of this sale, 
Treasury’s shares of Series G Preferred Stock were cancelled as 
agreed to by AIG and Treasury as part of the recapitalization.43 
In June 2009, AIG’s stock traded at less than $1.00 per 
share.44 Its stock price, however, did not come roaring back as one 
might conclude from the above table. After the market closed on 
June 30, 2009, AIG effected a one-for-twenty reverse stock split.45 
The purpose of the split was “to increase the per share trading 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Am. Int’l Grp., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated April 5, 
2011 (Form 424B3) (May 6, 2012). 
 36. See Press Release, Am. Int’l Grp., AIG Announces the U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury Completes Offering of AIG Common Stock (May 11, 2012), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/05/10/idUS256544+10-May-
2012+BW20120510 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 37. See Am. Int’l Grp., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated June 
29, 2012 (Form 424B3) (Aug. 3, 2012). 
 38. See Anthony Hughes, Treasury’s Latest AIG Offering Gets Upsized, 
REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/03/aig-shares-
idINL2E8J3C9W20120803 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Weighted average price per share, i.e., $51,610,497,444.50 divided by 
1,655,037,962. 
 42. See Prospectus Supplement (May 24, 2011), supra note 31. 
 43. See Am. Int’l Grp., Amended and Restated Purchase Agreement (Form 
8-K), Exhibit 2.1, §§ 2.08(b), 3.02 (Jan. 14, 2011); Prospectus Supplement (May 
24, 2011), supra note 31. 
 44. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 945. 
 45. See Am. Int’l Grp., Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10-Q) (July 31, 2009). 
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price of AIG Common Stock.”46 AIG’s stock closed at $1.16 per 
share on that day and opened on July 1, 2009 at $19.65 per share 
as a result of the split going into effect.47 Thus, the $31.18 
average price at which Treasury sold its shares equates to a pre-
split price of $1.56 per share. 
In light of its exit from AIG, Treasury issued a press release 
on December 11, 2012, touting a $22.7 billion “overall positive 
return on the Federal Reserve and Treasury’s combined $182 
                                                                                                     
 46. Am. Int’l Grp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 66 (June 5, 2009). AIG’s 
rationale for the split was that: 
Many investment funds and institutional investors have investment 
guidelines and policies that prohibit them from investing in, or 
holding in their portfolios, stocks whose price is below a certain 
threshold, which, at current AIG Common Stock market prices, 
reduces the number of potential investors for AIG Common Stock. 
AIG believes that brokerage firms are reluctant to recommend lower-
priced stocks to their clients. Also, other investors may be dissuaded 
from purchasing lower-priced stocks because the brokerage 
commissions, as a percentage of the total transaction, tend to be 
higher for such stocks. The reverse stock split could address these 
concerns by helping to ensure that the price of AIG Common Stock 
attains a level that would be viewed more favorably by potential 
investors. 
The share price of AIG Common Stock has declined significantly since 
the third quarter of 2008, and, during February and March 2009, and 
occasionally since then, it has closed below $1.00 per share. With the 
shares trading at this level, small moves in absolute terms in the 
price per share of AIG Common Stock translate into 
disproportionately large swings in the price on a percentage basis. 
AIG Common Stock currently trades on the NYSE under the symbol 
“AIG.” AIG Common Stock will be quoted on the NYSE at the post-
split price on and after the effective date of the amendment. The 
NYSE has several continued listing criteria that companies must 
satisfy in order to remain listed on the exchange, including minimum 
share price requirements. While the NYSE has temporarily 
suspended the minimum share price requirement, this suspension 
may be terminated at any time and, in any event, the suspension 
expires on June 30, 2009. As a result, unless the trading price of AIG 
Common Stock continues to trade above $1.00 per share, AIG 
Common Stock could be delisted from the NYSE after June 30, 2009. 
 47. See Yahoo! Finance AIG Historical Stock Prices, YAHOO!, 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=AIG&a=06&b=1&c=2009&d=06&e=1&f=2009&
g=d (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (providing daily AIG stock information) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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million commitment to stabilize AIG during the financial 
crisis . . . .”48 Here are Treasury’s calculations:49 








Federal Reserve $112.5 billion $130.2 billion +$17.7 billion 
 Fed Loans to AIG $35.0 billion $41.8 billion +$6.8 billion 
 AIA/ALICO SPV, 
Preferred 
Interests 
$25.0 billion $26.4 billion +$1.4 billion 
 Maiden Lane II & 
III 
$52.5 billion $62.0 billion +$9.5 billion50 
Treasury $69.8 billion $74.8 billion +$5.0 billion 
Common Stock $47.5 billion $51.6 billion +$4.1 billion 
Preferred Stock $22.3 billion $23.2 billion +$0.9 billion 
Total $182.3 billion51 $205.0 billion +$22.7 billion 
As you can see, the biggest portion of the $22.7 billion came 
from Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III. Maiden Lane II was a 
NY Fed-controlled limited liability company formed as part of the 
RMBS Purchase Facility. This facility was established as part of 
the first restructuring of aid to AIG to address continuing 
                                                                                                     
 48. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Sells Final Shares 
of AIG Common Stock, Positive Return on Overall AIG Commitment Reaches 
$22.7 Billion (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg1796.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 49. Id. 
 50. NY Fed press releases put this number at $9.4 billion—$2.8 billion by 
Maiden Lane II (see Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of NY, New York Fed 
Sells Remainder of Maiden Lane II LLC Securities; Approximately $2.8 Billion 
Net Gain Generated for U.S. Public from the Portfolio (Feb. 28, 2012), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/an120228.html (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)), and 
$6.6 billion by Maiden Lane III (see Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of NY, 
New York Fed Sells MAX CDO Holdings in Competitive Process (Apr. 26, 2012) 
[hereinafter Press Release, NY Fed Sells], http://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
newsevents/news/markets/2012/an120426.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). Presumably, the discrepancy comes 
from rounding.  
 51. See e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-490T, FEDERAL 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO 
AIG 3 (2009) (calculating the value at $182.5 billion, the number used in The 
AIG Bailout). It is unclear what explains this $0.2 billion discrepancy, but that 
difference should be viewed as immaterial. 
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problems with AIG’s securities lending program.52 Specifically, in 
December 2008, the NY Fed loaned Maiden Lane II $19.5 billion, 
which it used to purchase $39.3 billion face amount in residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) from AIG. These securities 
were originally purchased by AIG with cash collateral posted by 
borrowers under its securities lending program.53 The NY Fed 
retained BlackRock Financial Management Inc. to manage 
Maiden Lane II’s portfolio.54 BlackRock sold off the portfolio 
through a series of transactions over an eight-month period 
beginning in January 2012.55 As a result of improved conditions 
in the RMBS market, Maiden Lane II repaid the $19.5 billion 
loan to the NY Fed plus interest, fees, and a five-sixths share of 
the remaining profits made on the portfolio.56 The end result was 
a $2.8 billion net gain by the NY Fed on the deal.57 
Maiden Lane III was a NY Fed-controlled limited liability 
company formed as part of the Multi-Sector CDO Purchase 
Facility. This facility was established as part of the first aid 
restructuring to address AIG’s continuing collateral posting 
obligations from its credit default swap (CDS) portfolio.58 
Specifically, the NY Fed loaned Maiden Lane III $24.3 billion, 
which it used to purchase collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
                                                                                                     
 52. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 8-K) (Dec. 15, 2008); see also Sjostrom, 
supra note 1, at 971. 
 53. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, Part IV.B (describing AIG’s securities 
lending program). For much more detail on AIG’s securities lending program, 
see Hester Pierce, Securities Lending and the Untold Story in the Collapse of 
AIG Part IV (George Mason University Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 14-12, 
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435161. 
 54. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of NY, New York Fed to Sell 
Maiden Lane II Assets in Competitive Process over Time (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2011/an110330.html (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 55. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of NY, New York Fed Sells 
Remainder of Maiden Lane II LLC Securities; Approximately $2.8 Billion Net 
Gain Generated for U.S. Public from the Portfolio (Feb. 28, 2012), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/an120228.html (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 8-K) (Dec. 2, 2008); see also Sjostrom, 
supra note 1, at 971–72. 
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from various counterparties to AIGFP’s multi-sector CDO CDSs 
in exchange for these counterparties concurrently terminating 
the related CDSs (as discussed in the next Part, these 
transactions stirred up a bit of controversy).59 As it did with 
Maiden Lane II, the NY Fed retained BlackRock to manage 
Maiden Lane III’s portfolio.60 BlackRock sold off the portfolio 
through a series of transactions over a four-month period 
beginning in April 2012.61 As a result of improved conditions in 
the CDO market, Maiden Lane III repaid the $24.3 billion loan to 
the NY Fed plus interest, fees, and a 67% share of the profits 
made on the portfolio.62 The end result was a $6.6 billion net gain 
by the NY Fed on the deal.63 
Some commentators have taken issue with the government 
combining returns earned by Treasury and the Fed in arriving at 
the $22.7 billion positive net return (Neal Barofsky, former 
Special Inspector General for TARP, being the most prominent), 
characterizing it as misleading.64 I disagree. As the Fed notes: 
                                                                                                     
 59. See Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF NY, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) 
(chronicling the history of the transactions) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Press Release, Fed. Bank of NY, New York Fed Sells 
Remainder of Maiden Lane III LLC Securities; Marks End of AIG-Related 
Assistance; Approximately $6.6 Billion Net Gain Generated for U.S. Public from 
the Portfolio (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/ 
markets/2012/an120823.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 60. See Press Release, NY Fed Sells, supra note 59.  
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See, e.g., Mark Gongloff, Huge AIG Bailout Profit ‘Misleading’, Says Ex-
TARP Watchdog, HUFFINGTON POST BUSINESS (Dec. 11, 2012, 2:39 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/11/aig-bailout-profit_n_2277676.html 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (explaining the figure is misleading because a third of 
the stock sold came from the Federal Reserve and not the bailout) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Francine McKenna, Did the Government 
Profit from AIG? That’s the Wrong Question, AM. BANKER (Sept. 14, 2012, 10:00 
AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/did-the-government-profit-
from-AIG-thats-the-wrong-question-1052653-1.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) 
(noting that the government uses the term “positive return” instead of “profit”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); James Tilson and Robert E. 
Prasch, It Was Not a Free Lunch: The True Cost of the AIG Bailout, THE BIG 
PICTURE (Jan. 28, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/01/the-
true-cost-of-the-aig-bailout/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (describing multiple cover-
806 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795 (2015) 
“After it pays its expenses, the Federal Reserve turns the rest of 
its earnings over to the U.S. Treasury. About 95 percent of the 
Reserve Banks’ net earnings have been paid into the Treasury 
since the Federal Reserve System began operations in 1914.”65 In 
other words, the overwhelming majority of Fed earnings are 
aggregated with Treasury’s earnings as a matter of course, and it 
has been that way since 1914. 
The bottom line is that the government committed so much 
money to AIG out of fear that global financial markets would 
otherwise collapse, and not to generate a positive net return. At 
one point, in fact, many thought the government would lose 
billions on the AIG bailout.66 Thus, I view the final tally as a 
pleasant surprise. 
III. Maiden Lane III Transactions 
A. Overview 
As discussed in The AIG Bailout, the principal culprit in the 
collapse of AIG was the collateral posting obligations with respect 
to CDSs AIGFP67 wrote on multi-sector CDOs with subprime 
                                                                                                     
ups, including special tax treatment for AIG) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 65. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 11 (2005), http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf. 
 66. See Associated Press, AIG Likely Won’t Be Able to Pay Taxpayers Back, 
U.S. BUS. (Mar. 16, 2009, 8:06:39 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/ 
29728732/ns/business-us_business/t/aig-likely-wont-be-able-pay-taxpayers-back 
/#.VR19LvnF98E (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT PANEL 
REPORT, THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT 
STRATEGY 4 (Jun. 2010) [hereinafter JUNE OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT], 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT5669 
8.pdf (stating, with respect to AIG, that “[e]ven at this late stage, it remains 
unclear whether taxpayers will ever be repaid in full” and that “[t]he 
Congressional Budget Office . . . currently estimates that taxpayers will lose $36 
billion”). 
 67. See Am. Int’l Grp., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (10-K), at 3 (Feb. 28, 2008) (explaining that 
AIG operated its CDS business through its subsidiaries, AIG Financial Products 
Corp. and AIG Trading Group, Inc., and their respective subsidiaries, which are 
collectively known as AIGFP). 
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mortgage exposure (the Subprime CDSs).68 Specifically, as the 
U.S. housing market deteriorated, AIG was required to post more 
and more collateral with the protection buyers of the Subprime 
CDSs.69 These growing collateral posting obligations, combined 
with additional collateral calls triggered by AIG’s credit rating 
downgrade, drained AIG of cash, pushed it to the brink of 
bankruptcy, and ultimately led to the bailout.70 These collateral 
calls continued unabated following the initial bailout because the 
U.S. housing market continued to deteriorate. AIG was able to 
draw on the $85 billion Fed Credit Facility to meet these calls, 
but it became apparent that the facility would be inadequate.71 
Thus, to help alleviate the situation, AIG and NY Fed established 
the Multi-Sector CDO Purchase Facility, as mentioned above.72 
The basic idea behind this facility was to eliminate the 
constant outflow of cash from the collateral posting obligations of 
the Subprime CDSs by striking deals with the counterparties to 
these contracts.73 Specifically, Maiden Lane III agreed to 
(1) purchase from the counterparties the CDOs underlying the 
Subprime CDSs at fair market value, and (2) allow the 
counterparties to retain the collateral payments they had 
received from AIG pursuant to the CDSs.74 As a result, these 
counterparties received effectively the par value of the CDOs, or 
100 cents on the dollar, when the market value of the CDOs at 
the time was less than 50 cents on the dollar.75 In exchange, the 
counterparties agreed to terminate the related Subprime CDSs 
which, among other things, would put an end to AIG’s attendant 
                                                                                                     
 68. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 960 (describing the problems with multi-
sector CDOs). 
 69. See id. (analyzing the impact of the defaults). 
 70. See id. at 990 (noting the causes of AIG’s collapse). 
 71. See JUNE OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT, supra note 66, at 68 (discussing the 
inadequacies of the Fed Credit Facility); OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. 
FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO 
LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES 12 (Nov. 17, 2009) [hereinafter 
SIGTARP REPORT], http://www.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/ Factors_Affecting 
_Efforts_to_Limit_Payments_to_AIG_Counterparties.pdf (warning that more 
government support was needed). 
 72. See SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 73. See id. at 14. 
 74. See id. at 2. 
 75. See JUNE OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT, supra note 66, at 74. 
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collateral posting obligations. Maiden Lane III closed on these 
transactions in November and December of 2008.76 The below 
table lists the counterparties and the amounts received (in 
billions).77 





(as of 11/7/08) 
Total Percent of 
Total 
Société Générale $6.9 $9.6 $16.5 26.6% 
Goldman Sachs $5.6 $8.4 $14.0 22.5% 
Merrill Lynch $3.1 $3.1 $6.2 10.0% 
Deutsche Bank $2.8 $5.7 $8.5 13.7% 
UBS $2.5 $1.3 $3.8 6.1% 
Calyon $1.2 $3.1 $4.3 6.9% 
Deutsche Zentral-
Genonssenschaftsbank 
$1.0 $0.8 $1.8 2.9% 
Bank of Montreal $0.9 $0.5 $1.4 2.3% 
Wachovia $0.8 $0.2 $1.0 1.6% 
Barclays $0.6 $0.9 $1.5 2.4% 
Bank of America $0.5 $0.3 $0.8 1.3% 
The Royal Bank of Scotland $0.5 $0.6 $1.1 1.8% 
Dresdner Bank AG $0.4 $0.0 $0.4 0.6% 
Rabobank $0.3 $0.3 $0.6 1.0% 
Landesbank Baden-
Wuerttemberg 
$0.1 $0.0 $0.1 0.2% 
HSBC Bank, USA $0.078 $0.2 $0.2 0.3% 
Total $27.1 $35.0 $62.1  
                                                                                                     
 76. See Current Report, supra note 53. 
 77. See SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71, at 20. 
 78. See id. (rounding down amount in SIGTARP Report to $0). 
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These Maiden Lane III transactions ended up being “perhaps 
the most controversial element” of the entire AIG bailout79 for 
two reasons: (1) the counterparties were not required to take a 
“haircut,” and (2) the NY Fed initially refused to disclose the 
counterparties’ identities. The Office of the Special Inspector 
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) 
investigated both of these issues.80 I draw on the resulting report 
below (SIGTARP Report).81 
B. No Haircuts 
The term “haircut” in this context refers to the 
counterparties voluntarily taking less than 100 cents on the 
dollar in exchange for terminating their Subprime CDS 
contracts.82 From a purely economic standpoint, it is easy to see 
why they would be reluctant to do so as demonstrated by the 
following hypothetical. Assume that the investment portfolio of X 
Bank includes a $10 million CDO with subprime exposure that it 
bought at par ($10 million) in 2005. To reduce the risk associated 
with this CDO, X Bank decides to buy a five-year CDS on this 
CDO in the notional amount of $10 million from AIGFP. X Bank 
timely makes all quarterly payments due AIGFP under the CDS 
contract. Because of the housing market collapse, X Bank’s CDO 
plummets in value from $10 million to $4.5 million. X Bank, 
however, is not overly concerned about this $5.5 million decrease 
because the CDS protects it from losses. Either (1) the CDO 
issuer will be able to meet its payment obligations, which means 
X Bank will get 100 cents on the dollar plus interest on its 
investment, or (2) the CDO issuer will not be able to meet its 
payment obligations thereby triggering AIGFP’s obligation to pay 
                                                                                                     
 79. Newman, supra note 10. 
 80. See generally Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, § 12 (2008) (establishing SIGRARP, which provided 
that SIGTARP has the duty “to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and 
investigations of the purchase, management, and sale of assets” under the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)). 
 81. See generally SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71. 
 82. See id. at 14 (stating that the NY Fed “could seek a reduction in the 
amount that counterparties would receive, otherwise known as concessions or a 
‘haircut’”). 
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X Bank 100 cents on the dollar for the CDO underlying the CDS. 
On top of this, the government has essentially eliminated the 
counterparty credit risk to X Bank on the CDS by making it clear 
that it will not let AIG fail. Under either scenario, X Bank 
recovers its full $10 million investment. Thus, why would it agree 
to take a haircut as part of the Maiden Lane III deal when doing 
so would mean X Bank would recover less than $10 million?  
With that said, agreeing to a small haircut does perhaps 
make economic sense for X Bank. Specifically, by terminating the 
CDS, X Bank would no longer have to make the quarterly CDS 
spread payments to AIGFP and would get a time value of money 
benefit from receiving the $10 million sooner than under 
scenarios (1) or (2). However, if the CDS was just one piece of a 
complicated transaction, as is often the case in this realm, and 
not the straightforward situation of the hypothetical, these 
savings could easily be swallowed up by costs incurred to 
restructure the transaction in light of the early termination of the 
CDS. Regardless, insisting on par strikes me as a sensible initial 
negotiating position for the counterparties. 
NY Fed officials did contact by telephone the eight 
counterparties with the largest Subprime CDS positions (Société 
Générale, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank, UBS, 
Calyon, Barclays, and Bank of America) and asked them to agree 
to haircuts.83 The NY Fed’s main negotiating strategy apparently 
was to point out “the considerable direct and indirect benefits 
that the counterparties had derived from the Federal Reserve’s 
support of AIG.”84 Not surprisingly in light of the above analysis, 
seven of the eight counterparties refused to agree to a haircut.85 
UBS, the eighth counterparty, agreed to a two percent concession 
on the condition that the other counterparties agreed to the 
same.86 It seems the NY Fed then dropped the issue and, as a 
result, no counterparty took a haircut.87 
                                                                                                     
 83. SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71, at 15. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 18 (“[I]t was decided that FRBNY would cease efforts to 
negotiate haircuts and pay the counterparties the market value of the CDOs.”). 
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Consistent with my above hypothetical, according to the 
SIGTARP Report, counterparties gave the following reasons for 
refusing a haircut: 
 They had collateral already posted by AIG to 
protect against the risk of AIG default. The 
combination of collateral in their possession plus 
the fair market value of the underlying CDOs also 
in their possession equaled the par value of the 
credit default swaps. Thus, from the 
counterparty’s perspective, offering a concession 
would mean giving away value and voluntarily 
taking a loss, in contravention of their fiduciary 
duty to their shareholders. 
 In addition to the collateral, they had a 
reasonable expectation that AIG would not 
default on any further obligations under the 
credit default swaps because the U.S. government 
had already demonstrated that it would not allow 
AIG to go bankrupt. 
 They had already incurred costs to mitigate the 
risk of an AIG default on its obligations that 
would be exacerbated if they were paid less than 
par value. 
 They were contractually entitled to the par value 
of the credit default swap contracts.88 
The French banks (Société Générale and Calyon) made the 
additional argument, supported by French bank regulators, that 
under French law they could not legally agree to a haircut, absent 
an AIG bankruptcy.89 
The NY Fed came under fire for not insisting on haircuts or 
at least pressing counterparties harder on the issue,90 with the 
                                                                                                     
 88. Id. at 16. 
 89. See id. at 18 (“The Commission Bancaire spoke again with FRBNY and 
forcefully asserted that, under French law, absent an AIG bankruptcy, the 
banks could not voluntarily agree to less than par value for the underlying 
securities in exchange for terminating the swap contracts.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Michael Goodwin, Follow the Money: Enough About the AIG 
Bonuses—Focus on the Banks’ Billions, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 28, 2009), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/follow-money-aig-bonuses-focus-banks-billions-
article-1.366610 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“In a letter signed by 26 of his House 
colleagues, all Democrats, Maryland Rep. Elijah Cummings wrote: ‘Was any 
attempt made to renegotiate and close out these contracts with ‘haircuts’? If not, 
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House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
characterizing the NY Fed’s efforts as “just ‘going through the 
motions.’”91 The NY Fed cited various reasons for not pressing the 
issue, the primary one being it had little negotiating leverage.92 
Specifically, a standard negotiating technique by a distressed 
company seeking concessions from its creditors is to play the 
bankruptcy card, i.e., if you do not agree to concessions we will go 
bankrupt and you will end up with a lot less money than we are 
offering now. As mentioned above, the NY Fed could not play the 
bankruptcy card because prior government actions had 
essentially removed it from the deck.93 Further, the NY Fed was 
not comfortable suggesting otherwise out of concern that such a 
suggestion would “introduce doubt into the marketplace about 
the resolve of the U.S. government in following through on its 
commitments in support of financial stability” and perhaps 
negatively affect AIG’s credit rating.94 
With that said, the NY Fed could have used its status as 
regulator of several of the counterparties as negotiating leverage 
over them. It chose not to, however, for several reasons: “in the 
negotiations it was acting as a creditor of AIG and not as the 
counterparties’ primary regulator,” it was “uncomfortable with 
violating the principle of sanctity of contract,” and it felt strongly 
about treating all counterparties equally.95 On this last point, it 
                                                                                                     
why not?’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim 
Puzzanghera & Tom Hamburger, Goldman Sachs Defends $13-Billion Payment 
from AIG, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com 
/2009/mar/21/business/fi-aig-goldman21 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“But some 
lawmakers and others contended that holders of the insurance should have been 
forced to take less than 100%—a haircut in Wall Street parlance—because they 
would have gotten much less if AIG had been allowed to slip into bankruptcy.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mary Williams Walsh, Audit 
Faults New York Fed in A.I.G. Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/17/business/ 17aig.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 
2, 2015) (“The report concluded that the Fed’s efforts to negotiate concessions 
from A.I.G.’s trading partners had no chance of success because of several 
crucial positions taken by the Fed.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 91. JUNE OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT, supra note 66, at 148. 
 92. See SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71, at 18. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 19. 
AFTERWORD TO THE AIG BAILOUT 813 
could not exert regulatory pressure over counterparties not 
subject to its regulation, and therefore could not force concessions 
on all counterparties by this means.96 As a result, its self-imposed 
equality limitation prevented it from forcing anyone to take a 
haircut, or at least, that is the story.97 
The Treasury defended the NY Fed’s “negotiating strategy” 
in a November 16, 2009 letter to SIGTARP after reviewing a 
draft of the SIGTARP Report. Specifically, the letter stated as 
follows: 
What must be remembered is that the decision by the 
government not to let AIG go bankrupt meant that AIG had to 
meet its contractual obligations. The government could not 
unilaterally impose haircuts on creditors, and it would not 
have been appropriate for the government to pressure 
counterparties to accept haircuts by threatening to retaliate in 
some way through its regulatory power.98 
The explanation of the NY Fed and Treasury for not flexing 
any regulatory muscle is fair enough. As the SIGTARP Report 
points out, however, the “Treasury and the Federal Reserve were 
fully prepared to use their leverage as regulators to compel the 
nine largest financial institutions (including some of AIG’s 
counterparties) to accept $125 billion of TARP funding and to 
pressure Bank of America to conclude its merger with Merrill 
Lynch.”99 There are certainly a number a factors that distinguish 
those situations from the Maiden Lane III situation, but given 
the NY Fed’s emphasis on equal treatment, it should have 
articulated its reasons for what looks like different treatment of 
similar situations.  
                                                                                                     
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. (“Secretary Geithner further explained to Congress 
that ‘. . . because we have no legal mechanism in place for dealing with this, like 
we deal with banks, we did not have the ability to selectively impose losses on 
their counterparties.’”). 
 98. SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71, at 41–42. 
 99. Id. at 29; see also Mark Landler & Eric Dash, Drama Behind a $250 
Billion Banking Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2008/10/15/business/economy/15bailout.html?pagewanted=all (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (describing Treasury and Fed pressure put on banks to 
take deals) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
814 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795 (2015) 
C. Delayed Disclosure 
As a public company,100 AIG is required by Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations to file with the SEC a 
“current report” generally within four business days after the 
occurrence of various events.101 The reports are posted on the 
SEC’s website within minutes of filing thereby becoming publicly 
available.102 Among the events that trigger a filing is entry by the 
company “into a material definitive agreement not made in the 
ordinary course of business . . . .”103 Such a filing must include the 
date of the agreement, the parties to the agreement, and “a brief 
description of the terms and conditions of the agreement . . . that 
are material to the [company].”104 AIG filed an initial current 
report regarding the Maiden Lane III transactions on December 
2, 2008. Here is what the report said: 
AIGFP, [Maiden Lane] III and the NY Fed have entered into 
agreements with AIGFP’s CDS counterparties to terminate 
approximately $53.5 billion notional amount of CDS and 
purchase the related Multi-Sector CDOs. Of these, CDOs with 
a principal amount of approximately $46.1 billion settled on 
November 25, 2008 and a corresponding notional amount of 
CDS were terminated. Settlement on the remaining $7.4 
billion notional amount of CDS is contingent upon the ability 
of the related counterparty to obtain the related Multi-Sector 
CDOs and thereby settle with [Maiden Lane] III and 
terminate . . . .105 
                                                                                                     
 100. In this Article, the term “public company” is used to denote a company 
with securities registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
 101. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(1) (2012) (requiring security issuers to file 
“information and documents (and such copies thereof) as the Commission shall 
require to keep reasonably current” such information); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11(a) 
(2014) (noting the requirement for registrants to “file a current report on Form 
8–K within the period specified in that form”); SEC, Form 8-K, General 
Instructions, B(1) (providing the instructions for which events to report and 
when to report). 
 102. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Free, Real-Time Public Access 
to EDGAR Database at www.sec.gov (May 30, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2002-75.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 103. SEC, Form 8-K, Information to be Included in the Report, § 1-1.01(a). 
 104. Id. § 1-1.01(a)(2). 
 105. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Dec. 2, 2008). 
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Notice that there is no mention of the amount or price paid to the 
counterparties or their identities. 
AIG filed another current report regarding the Maiden Lane 
III transactions on December 24, 2008 which stated as follows: 
On December 18, 2008 and December 22, 2008, [Maiden Lane] 
III purchased $16 billion in par amount of additional Multi-
Sector CDOs, including approximately $8.5 billion of Multi-
Sector CDOs underlying 2a-7 Puts written by AIGFP. 
The purchase of these Multi-Sector CDOs was funded with a 
net payment to counterparties of approximately $6.7 billion 
and the surrender by AIGFP of approximately $9.2 billion in 
collateral previously posted by AIGFP to CDS counterparties 
in respect of the terminated CDS.106 
As you can see, AIG disclosed more information on the 
transactions, specifically the total par value of the CDOs 
purchased ($16 billion) and the amount paid ($6.7 billion plus 
$9.2 billion, or $15.9 billion), making it easy to deduce that the 
price paid was par, even though the disclosure does not explicitly 
state this. Once again, however, the identities of the 
counterparties were not disclosed. 
In addition to a description of the material terms of an 
agreement, the filing of a current report for entry into a material 
definitive agreement must also include a copy of the actual 
agreement or agreements.107 AIG filed a copy of a Master 
Investment and Credit Agreement and a Shortfall Agreement as 
part of its December 2, 2008 current report,108 and Amendment 
No. 1 to the Shortfall Agreement as part of its December 24, 2008 
current report.109 The Shortfall Agreement and the Amendment 
                                                                                                     
 106. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 1 (Dec. 24, 2008). 
 107. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(a)(1) (2014) (requiring exhibits to be “filed as 
indicated” by exhibit table); 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10) (2014) (defining material 
contracts required by exhibit table); SEC, Form 8-K, Information to be Included 
in the Report, § 9-9.01(d) (requiring exhibits). 
 108. See Filing Detail, American International Group, Inc., U.S. SEC. AND 
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 2, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
5272/000095012308016800/0000950123-08-016800-index.htm (last visited Apr. 
2, 2015) (listing master investment and credit agreement and shortfall as 
exhibits to form 8-K) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 109. See Filing Detail, American International Group, Inc., U.S. SEC. AND 
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 24, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
5272/000095012308018339/0000950123-08-018339-index.htm (last visited Apr. 
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both apparently included a Schedule A that specified with respect 
to each counterparty its identity, the notional amount of 
Subprime CDSs it held, how much collateral the counterparty 
had received from AIGFP for such CDSs, and the difference 
between the notional value and the market value of the CDOs 
underlying such CDSs.110 AIG, however, omitted Schedule A from 
the copies of these agreements it filed with the related current 
reports.111 
The lack of disclosure regarding the Maiden Lane III 
transactions did not go unnoticed for long. On December 30, 2008, 
the SEC sent a letter to AIG noting the missing Schedule A and 
stating that when filing an agreement in connection with a 
current report “you are required to file the entire agreement, 
including all exhibits, schedules, appendices and any document 
which is incorporated in the agreement.”112 It thus directed AIG 
to amend its fillings.113 AIG responded by filing an amended 
current report on January 14, 2009, that included another copy of 
the Shortfall Agreement, which contained Schedule A.114 
However, AIG deleted all information from the schedule, 
replacing it with the following: “The confidential portion of this 
Schedule A has been omitted and filed separately with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. Confidential Treatment 
has been requested for the omitted portions.”115  
                                                                                                     
2, 2015) (listing amendment no. 1 to shortfall agreement as exhibit to Form 8-K) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 110. See Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K), Exhibit 10.2, Shortfall 
Agreement, at 1 (Dec. 24, 2008); Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K), 
Exhibit 10.1, Shortfall Agreement as Amended, at 1 (Dec. 24, 2008).  
 111. See sources cited supra note 110 (showing no Schedule A attached to 
the agreement or amendment). 
 112. Letter from Jeffrey P. Riedler, Assistant Director, SEC, to Edward M. 
Libby, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, A.I.G., 1 (Dec. 30, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000000000008063970/filename 
1.pdf.  
 113. Id. at 2. For more on confidential treatment requests, see SEC Staff 
Legal Bulletin No. 1, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (July 11, 2001), 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/slbcf1r.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 114. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K/A), at 2 (Jan. 14, 2009).  
 115. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K/A), Exhibit 10.1, Schedule A 
(Jan. 14, 2009). 
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What AIG did here is not unusual; SEC regulations allow a 
company to omit portions from a filed document in connection 
with requesting confidential treatment from the SEC,116 but 
omitting the information was not well received by the public. 
Hence, in a March 5, 2009 United States Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs hearing on AIG, Senator 
Dodd called for disclosure of the counterparties and amounts 
paid.117 In response, Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman of the Fed, 
stated: “We need AIG to be stable and to continue in a stable 
condition, and I would be very concerned that if we started giving 
out the name of counterparties here, people wouldn’t want to do 
business with AIG.”118 Vice Chairman Kohn further stated “that 
giving the names would undermine the stability of the company 
and could have serious knock-on effects to the rest of the financial 
markets and the government’s efforts to stabilize them.”119 
The issue was widely picked up by the press following the 
hearing, intensifying pressure on AIG to disclose the 
information.120 Thus, on March 15, 2009, AIG, “after close 
                                                                                                     
 116. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2 (2014) (describing the procedure to obtain 
confidential treatment). 
 117. See American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong, 
Government Intervention, and Implications for Future Regulation, U.S. 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS (Mar. 5, 2009), 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Hearing
&Hearing_ID=1655fd01-154e-48de-9fd8-2832a68f04d6 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) 
(providing majority statement and list of witnesses) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); American International Group: Examining 
What Went Wrong, Government Intervention, and Implications for Future 
Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban 
Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111shrg51303/html/CHRG-111shrg51303.htm (providing a copy of the 
transcript of the senate hearing). 
 118. American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong, 
Government Intervention, and Implications for Future Regulation: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(statement of Donald Kohn, Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., Colin Barr, Fed Wants to Keep AIG Secrets, FORTUNE (Mar. 5, 
2009), http://archive.fortune.com/2009/03/05/news/fed.transparency.fortune/ind 
ex.htm?postversion=2009030512 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (discussing negative 
responses of senators to AIG withholding information) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Sue Kirchhoff, Lawmakers Press Fed for AIG 
Answers, Overall Price Tag, USA TODAY (Mar. 6, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
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consultation with the Federal Reserve,” disclosed the names of 
the counterparties in a press release but not the amounts each 
counterparty received.121 The next day AIG filed amended current 
reports that included the now infamous Schedule A to the 
Shortfall Agreement with the counterparty names and aggregate 
totals for notional value, collateral posted, and negative mark to 
market now included, with all other information largely 
redacted.122 On August 15, 2009, AIG once again filed amended 
current reports with a new Schedule A to the Shortfall 
Agreement, still with substantial redactions, but disclosing how 
much collateral each counterparty received from AIGFP and the 
additional amounts Maiden Lane III paid each counterparty.123 
To be sure, it was AIG and not the NY Fed or Treasury that 
was obligated under SEC regulations to disclose details regarding 
the Maiden Lane III transactions. It appears, however, that AIG 
was essentially not permitted to file the Maiden Lane III current 
reports until it incorporated NY Fed edits such as removing 
references to buying out counterparties at par.124 Hence, it is fair 
                                                                                                     
Business/story?id=7019341 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“Lawmakers Thursday 
sharply criticized state and federal regulators for failing to prevent the 
meltdown of insurance giant American International Group AIG, and for what 
they termed the secretive handling of its multibillion-dollar government 
bailout.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mary Williams 
Walsh, Senators Ask Who Got Money From A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/business/economy/06insure.html?_ r=0 (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“[A] Senate panel told the vice chairman of the Federal 
Reserve to identify all the parties made whole by the bailout of the American 
International Group or forget about coming back to ask Congress for more 
rescue money.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 121. AIG Discloses Counterparties to CDS, GIA and Securities Lending 
Transactions, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 15, 2009), http://www.businesswire. 
com/news/home/20090315005036/en (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 122. See Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K/A), Exhibit 10.1, 
Schedule A (Mar. 16, 2009); Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K/A), 
Exhibit 10.1, Schedule A (Mar. 16, 2009).  
 123. See Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K/A), Exhibit 10.1, 
Schedule A (May 15, 2009); Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K/A), 
Exhibit 10.1, Schedule A (May 15, 2009).  
 124. See COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV. REFORM, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AS A 
LAST RESORT: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE FOUGHT TO COVER UP THE DETAILS OF 
THE AIG COUNTERPARTIES BAILOUT FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 111TH CONG., at 
6–7 (Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT II] (describing 
chronologically the actions of the FRNBY to prevent AIG information from 
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to view the NY Fed as the final arbiter of the content and timing 
of AIG’s Maiden Lane III transactions disclosure. In other words, 
it was the NY Fed and not AIG that was trying to keep various 
details private. 
D. “Backdoor Bailout” 
The combination of no haircuts for the counterparties and the 
obvious reluctance of the government to release various details 
about the Maiden Lane III transactions led to this facet of the 
AIG bailout being labeled as a “backdoor bailout” of the 
counterparties.125 As the story goes, the NY Fed structured the 
Maiden Lane III transactions and tried to keep their details 
secret at least in part to surreptitiously funnel billions of dollars 
to Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and other large banks.126 NY 
Fed officials denied this characterization, asserting that 
benefiting the counterparties was not a relevant consideration for 
these transactions.127 As the SIGTARP Report points out, 
“[i]rrespective of their stated intent, however, there is no question 
that the effect of [the NY Fed’s] decisions—indeed, the very 
design of the federal assistance to AIG—was that tens of billions 
of dollars of Government money was funneled inexorably and 
directly to AIG’s counterparties.”128 
                                                                                                     
becoming public). 
 125. See Matthew Goldstein, E-mails on AIG Bailout Detail Fed’s Push for 
Secrecy, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/ 
jan/25/business/la-fi-aig25-2010jan25 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“Lawmakers on 
Capitol Hill have labeled the AIG bailout . . . a ‘backdoor bailout’ for the 16 
financial institutions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see 
also OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT II, supra note 124, at 16. 
 126. See Frank Rich, The Other Plot to Wreck America, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/opinion/10rich.html (last visited Apr. 
2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also OVERSIGHT 
PANEL REPORT II, supra note 124, at 2 (stating that Maiden Lane III facilitated 
“the backdoor bailout of AIG’s counterparties, and the direct payment of $27.1 
billion of taxpayer money (and the waiver of an additional $35 billion in 
collateral) to the largest banks in the U.S. and around the world”). 
 127. See SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 71, at 30. 
 128. Id. 
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IV. Regulatory Response 
As discussed in The AIG Bailout, CDSs fell into an 
intentional regulatory gap that AIG exploited to pursue a multi-
billion dollar CDS business free from regulatory filings, 
mandated capital requirements, and government intervention.129 
As discussed in this Part, the gap has since been closed by the 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd–Frank),130 the principal federal regulatory response to the 
financial crisis. This Act was signed into law by President Obama 
on July 21, 2010.131 Its stated purposes were “[t]o promote the 
financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 
‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services 
practices, and for other purposes.”132 The Act consisted of fifteen 
titles addressing a variety of aspects of the financial crisis.133 
A. Dodd–Frank Title VII 
Dodd–Frank Title VII—Wall Street Transparency and 
Accountability is the most relevant title to what happened at 
AIG. Among other things, it provides for comprehensive 
regulation of credit default and other swaps.134 Below I discuss 
how these regulations would have applied to AIG had they been 
in place at the time AIGFP started selling CDSs.  
                                                                                                     
 129. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 983–89 (discussing the CDS regulatory 
gap). 
 130. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–
Frank), Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). 
 131. See Bill Summary & Status, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04173:@@@S (last visited Apr. 
2, 2015) (noting at the second-to-last entry that it was signed by the President 
on July 21, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 132. Dodd–Frank, 124 Stat. at 1376. 
 133. Dodd–Frank § 1(b). 
 134. See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and 
“Security-Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap 
Agreement Recordkeeping, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9338, 34-67453, 77 
Fed. Reg. 48,208 (proposed Aug. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Further Definition 
Release]. 
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The regulatory scheme is complicated, with different 
regulations applying depending on the type of swap involved.135 
The two broad categories of swaps are security-based swaps 
(SBS), which are generally regulated by the SEC, and non-
security based swaps, which are generally regulated by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).136 Somewhat 
confusingly, the regulations refer to non-security based swaps 
simply as “swaps.” To avoid confusion, I refer to them here as 
“NSBS.” 
A CDS can fall under either category depending on what it 
references, or is based on.137 SBSs are generally swaps based on 
securities or loans. Included in this category are the following: 
 swaps based on “a single security or loan, including 
any interest therein or on the value thereof”;138 
 swaps based on “an index that is a narrow-based 
security index,139 including any interest therein or on 
the value thereof”;140 and 
 swaps based on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an 
event relating to the issuer of a security that “directly 
affects the financial statements, financial condition, or 
financial obligations of the issuer.”141 
A CDS that falls outside of the definition of SBS generally 
falls under the definition of NSBS.142 
                                                                                                     
 135. See id. at 48,210 (“[T]he CFTC is given regulatory authority over 
swaps, the SEC is given regulatory authority over security-based swaps, and the 
Commissions shall jointly prescribe such regulations regarding mixed swaps as 
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of Title VII.”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. at 48,249 (noting that a CDS “may be a swap or a security-based 
swap”). 
 138. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68)(A)(ii)(II) (2012). 
 139. See id. § 78c(a)(55)(B) (stating that a narrow-based security index is 
generally defined as an index comprised of nine or fewer component securities 
and meeting specified weighting criteria). 
 140. Id. § 78c(a)(68)(A)(ii)(I). 
 141. Id. § 78c(a)(68)(A)(ii)(III). “[S]uch events could include, for example, the 
bankruptcy of an issuer, a default on one of an issuer’s debt securities, or the 
default on a non-security loan of an issuer.” Further Definition Release, supra 
note 134, at 48,267. 
 142. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1a(47)(A)–(B) (specifying that a CDS is a swap but 
excluding from the definition of swap a SBS, other than a mixed swap). 
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As described in The AIG Bailout, the bulk of AIGFP’s $527 
billion net-notional amount CDS portfolio was comprised of 
protection it wrote on what it referred to as the “super senior” 
tranche of various types of asset-backed securities.143 In this 
context, a tranche refers to one of multiple series, or types, of 
debt securities issued by an SPV.144 In other words, a CDS on a 
tranche is a swap based on a “single security” and therefore an 
SBS. Thus, for this Part, I assume that all CDSs written by 
AIGFP were SBSs, and therefore subject to SEC and not CFTC 
regulation.145 
A primary purpose of the SEC SBS rules is to regulate the 
significant players in the SBS market—so called “security-based 
swap dealers” and “major security-based swap participants.”146 
AIGFP would have fallen under the definition of a security-based 
swap dealer (SBSD). Specifically, an SBSD is a person147 that (1) 
holds itself out as a dealer in SBSs, (2) makes a market in SBSs, 
(3) regularly enters into SBSs “with counterparties as an 
ordinary course of business for its own account,” or (4) “engages 
in activity causing itself to be commonly known in the trade as a 
dealer or market maker” in SBSs,148 unless, among other things, 
the person never engaged in $8 billion or more in notional 
amount of SBS CDS transactions over any particular twelve-
                                                                                                     
 143. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 955 (discussing in detail AIG’s super 
senior tranche). 
 144. See id. at 953. 
 145. My sentence on the size and composition of AIGFP’s CDS portfolio is 
based on statements in AIG’s 2007 annual report. It is not clear from this 
document if all of the CDSs written by AIGFP are in fact based on a single 
security. Had the swap categories existed in 2007, presumably AIG’s 2007 
annual report would have stated which of the two categories (SBS or NSBS) its 
CDSs fell into or would have structured all of them to fall only in the SBS 
category to avoid being subject to regulation by both the SEC and CFTC. 
 146. Statement of General Policy on the Sequencing of the Compliance 
Dates for Final Rules Applicable to Security-Based Swaps Adopted Pursuant to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67177, 77 Fed. Reg. 
35,625, 35,626 (proposed June 14, 2012) [hereinafter Sequencing Release]. 
 147. The Exchange Act defines the term “person” as “a natural person, 
company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a 
government.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (2012). 
 148. Id. § 78c(a)(71)(A). 
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month period.149 At a minimum, AIGFP would have fallen under 
category three because “AIGFP, in the ordinary course of 
operations and as principal, structure[d] and enter[ed] into 
derivative transactions to meet the needs of counterparties.”150 
and wrote more than $8 billion in notional amount of SBS CDSs 
in multiple twelve-month periods.151 
The SEC is still in the process of finalizing regulations 
mandated by Dodd–Frank for SBSDs. These regulations will 
include the following: 
 Required registration with, and reporting to, the 
SEC;152 
 SBS data reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements;153 
 External business conduct rules;154 
 Capital and margin requirements;155 
 Governance and risk-management requirements;156 
and 
 SBS clearing and exchange trading requirements.157 
This package of rules is similar to what was on the table when I 
wrote The AIG Bailout.158 As I said there, had these sorts of 
regulations been in place, especially capital, margin, clearing, 
and exchange trading requirements, it is likely that AIG would 
not have been able to build such a large and uncollateralized CDS 
position and, therefore, perhaps would not have collapsed. It is 
impossible to know definitively, especially because the devil is in 
                                                                                                     
 149. Id. § 78(c)(a)(71)(D) (“The Commission shall exempt from designation 
as a security-based swap dealer an entity that engages in a de minimis quantity 
of security-based swap dealing in connection with transactions with or on behalf 
of its customers.”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a71-2(a)(1) (2014). Note that the $8 billion 
notional value threshold will be lowered to $3 billion five years after certain 
data begins to be collected unless the SEC decides to either raise or lower 
sooner. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a71-2(a)(2)(ii)(B). 
 150. Am. Int’l Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 162 (Feb. 28, 2008). 
 151. See JUNE OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT, supra note 66, at 24 fig.9. 
 152. Dodd–Frank § 764(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(a) (2012). 
 153. Dodd–Frank § 766. 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(h). 
 155. Id. § 78o-10(e). 
 156. Id. § 78o-10(j). 
 157. Id. § 78c-3. 
 158. See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 989. 
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the details and the details remain to be determined. The SEC has 
proposed, but not finalized, registration rules,159 trade reporting 
rules,160 business conduct rules,161 capital and margin 
requirements,162 and recordkeeping rules.163 
It may seem surprising that these rules are not in place 
given that Dodd–Frank was signed into law over four years ago. 
Remember, however, that the SBS market was barely regulated 
prior to Dodd–Frank. In other words, the SEC has been tasked 
with creating a complicated regulatory framework out of whole 
cloth for a huge164 and complex but historically opaque market.165 
As a result, the SEC wants to give market players 
                                                                                                     
 159. See Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-
Based Swap Participants, Exchange Act Release No. 34-65543, 76 Fed. Reg. 
65,784 (proposed Oct. 24, 2011) (proposing a rule “to provide for the registration 
of SBS Entities”). 
 160. See Regulation SBSR—Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based 
Swap Information, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63346, 75 Fed. Reg. 75208 
(proposed Dec. 2, 2010) (proposing a rule to “provide for the reporting of 
security-based swap information to registered security-based swap data 
repositories or the Commission and the public dissemination of security-based 
swap transaction, volume, and pricing information”). 
 161. See Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap Dealers and 
Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64766, 
76 Fed. Reg. 42,396 (proposed July 18, 2011) (proposing a rule “relating to 
external business conduct standards”). 
 162. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based 
Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital 
Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-68071, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 70,214 (proposed Nov. 23, 2012) (proposing capital and margin, 
segregation, and notification requirements). 
 163. See Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements for Security-Based 
Swap Dealers, Major Security-Based Swap Participants, and Broker-Dealers; 
Capital Rule for Certain Security-Based Swap Dealers, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-71958, 79 Fed. Reg. 25,194 (proposed May 2, 2014) (proposing a rule for 
“recordkeeping, reporting, and notification requirements”). 
 164. For example, as of December 2013, there was $11.324 trillion in 
notional amount of single-name credit default swaps outstanding. Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, BIS 
Q. Rev. (Dec. 2014), http://www.bis.org/statistics/dt1920a.pdf. Single-name 
CDSs generally fall under the definition of SBS. See Further Definition Release, 
supra note 134, at 48,266 (“[A] single-name CDS that is based on a single 
reference obligation would be a security based swap because it would be based 
on a single security or loan . . . .”). 
 165. See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit 
Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 191 (2011) (noting limited 
recording requirements for CDS transactions prior to Dodd–Frank). 
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adequate, but not excessive, time to come into compliance with 
the final rules applicable to them, which includes (a) having an 
appropriate amount of time to analyze and understand the 
final rules to be adopted pursuant to Title VII, (b) having an 
appropriate amount of time to develop and test new systems 
required as a result of the new regulatory requirements for 
[SBSs], and (c) being subject to a phasing in of the 
requirements arising from the final rules to be adopted 
pursuant to Title VII, as appropriate.166 
B. Dodd–Frank Title I 
Title I—Financial Stability also presumably would have 
come into play had it been in place pre-AIG bailout. Specifically, 
Subtitle A established the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC),167 “a collaborative body chaired by the Secretary of the 
Treasury that brings together the expertise of the federal 
financial regulators, an independent insurance expert appointed 
by the President, and state regulators.”168 Among other things, 
FSOC can designate “nonbank financial companies that may pose 
risks to the financial stability of the United States in the event of 
their material financial distress or failure” as systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs).169 Such a designation 
triggers Fed supervision and enhanced prudential standards for 
the company.170 
The FSOC designated AIG a SIFI on July 8, 2013.171 Its 
reasoning was as follows: 
                                                                                                     
 166. Sequencing Release, supra note 146, at 35,630. 
 167. Dodd–Frank § 111. 
 168. Financial Stability Oversight Council, Frequently Asked Questions: 
What Is the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and What Does It Do?, 
U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/ 
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 169. Dodd–Frank § 112(a)(2)(H). 
 170. See id. 
 171. Financial Stability Oversight Committee, Basis of the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council’s Final Determination Regarding American 
International Group, Inc. at 1 (July 8, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Basis%20of%20Final%20Determination
%20Regarding%20American%20International%20Group,%20Inc.pdf.  
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Because of AIG’s size and interconnectedness, certain 
characteristics of its liabilities and products, the potential 
effects of a rapid liquidation of its assets, [and] potential 
challenges with resolvability . . . material financial distress at 
AIG could cause an impairment of financial intermediation or 
of financial market functioning that would be sufficiently 
severe to inflict significant damage on the broader economy.172 
As described by the FSOC: 
A final determination by the Council under section 113 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act . . . allow[s] the Board of Governors to apply a 
number of new requirements to AIG. These include the 
enhanced prudential standards required by sections 165 and 
166 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which, among other things, . . . 
require the company to: (1) meet enhanced liquidity and 
capital standards; (2) undergo and report periodic stress tests; 
(3) adopt enhanced risk-management processes; (4) submit a 
resolution plan providing for its rapid and orderly resolution in 
the event of its material financial distress or failure; and 
(5) provide for the early remediation of financial distress at the 
company on a consolidated basis. The enhanced prudential 
standards required by section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act are 
in addition to the authority that the Board of Governors now 
has to supervise and regulate [AIG] . . . for the purpose of 
“prevent[ing] or mitigat[ing] risks to the financial stability of 
the United States that could arise from the material financial 
distress, failure, or ongoing activities of large, interconnected 
financial institutions.” In addition, the Board of Governors 
[now has] additional authorities with respect to the review of 
any proposals by AIG to expand its size or scope.173 
V. Conclusion 
With the government’s exit from AIG, we can now close the 
books on the AIG bailout. Certainly, one could view the bailout as 
a success given the financial markets did not collapse and the 
government actually made money. However, because it is not 
possible to know what would have happened if AIG had been 
allowed to fail, whether bailing out AIG was the right call will 
always be subject to debate.  
                                                                                                     
 172. Id. at 2. 
 173. Id. at 9–10. 
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A prominent part of the AIG bailout legacy is the ensuing 
regulation it spawned. Hopefully, regulators learned lessons from 
episodes—such as the handling of the Maiden Lane III 
transactions—that they can draw on in future financial crises, 
especially given the regulatory expansion resulting from the 
Dodd–Frank Act. 
